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How can we generalize from the case studies in this volume? How represen-
tative are they? Are alternative post hoc rationalizations equally plausible? In
altered circumstances (inherently unpredictable at the time), would different
outcomes have been observed? Many ofthese questions are unanswerable: the
lessons ofthe cases are often sui generis, the counterfactuals are unknowable,
the data for comparable firms are unobtainable or no such firms exist. This
does not mean that cases cannotenrich ourunderstanding, butit has sometimes
led frustrated business historians to claim rather more for their craft than is
justifiable. This essay reviews some of their problems and suggests how we
might focus their research on areas where significant progress is more likely.
It addresses, particularly, the experience oflarge firms, in the context ofdiffer-
ences in national industrial systems and performance outcomes.
Writing at the time that large corporations were being built on an unprece-
dented scale, Alfred Marshall felt the need to modify his favored analogy of
firms in the economy as trees in the forest. In his first (1890) edition of the
Principles ofEconomics, he had suggested that, like trees in the forest, there
would be large and small firms, but "sooner or later age tells on them all."
However, by the sixth edition of 1910 he was cautioning that his earlier sen-
tence could appropriately be put in the past tense, for "vastjoint stock compa-
nies ... often stagnate, but do not readily die" (Marshall 1961, 316). Marshall
was an acute observer ofthe contemporary real economy in Britain, Germany,
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and America: he would not have modified his view without substantial evi-
dence that the Giant Redwoods he observed in these economies were qualita-
tively different from the nineteenth-century firms on which he had based his
generalizations oftwo decades earlier.
The work ofbusiness historians-even those who profoundly disagree with
Marshallian perspectives on industrial economics-has generally concurred
with his view that something new was happening in the twentieth-century cor-
porate world. Chandler (1990) and Lazonick (1991), for example, have sug-
gested that large corporations, by the beginning ofthis century, built significant
technical, organizational, and marketing capabilities, thus acquiring often un-
assailable first-mover advantages, so that they generally still dominate the
global oligopolies they first created. The purpose ofthis essay is not to question
whether they (and Marshall) are right, for they clearly are, but rather to estab-
lish the degree to which the traditional analogy of rising and declining trees,
or the implied new one of Giant Redwoods with a charmed life, perhaps of
centuries rather than decades, best describes the reality of the modem corpo-
rate economy. I will suggest that-on the evidence of the century so far-
there is some life in the old view and that understanding where and why helps
us diagnose the nature, strengths, and limits ofdynamic organizational capabil-
ities.
Skepticism about corporate capabilities is not universal among business his-
torians. The tendency to overemphasize successes (and to rationalize them ex
post)-whathas been criticized as the "Whig" misinterpretation in the context
ofpolitical history-is chronically endemic among them, as it is also among
businessmen and management consultants (see, e.g., Hamel and Prahalad
1994). It commonly coexists with the conviction that they have found the
unique recipe for rectifying the failure offirms or countries (a trait particularly
well-developed in the Anglo-Saxon world ofone-time leaders that have alleg-
edly failed). I believe that some ofthe insights this process has generated have
been valuable: ithas, for example, helpedus to understand the role ofcorporate
learning and organizational capabilities in generating asymmetries between
firms that provide a key to understanding competitive performance. Like Mo-
liere's Monsieur Jourdain and his prose, "new" industrial economists and busi-
ness historians are now beginning to formulate explicitly what thoughtful busi-
nessmen have long implicitly understood about the limits of the simpler,
neoclassical models of "old" industrial economists. The following comments
are not intended to undermine that endeavor, but to reinforce it by disciplining
some ofits more adventurous generalizations.
7.2 A Proposed Test
The overuse of the survivor technique, distorting our understanding of the
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plines besides business history. If we merely observe that many of the firms
that now dominate the economy are ofancient lineage,l or that some oftoday's
top firms were also at the top a century earlier, we might conclude that giant
firms are generally long-lasting; yet the stated observation is equally compati-
ble with the hypothesis that some initially small firms grow rapidly to become
large, while corporate giants have, over reasonably long periods, a poor sur-
vival rate. Our current knowledge of survivors dominates our impression of
the typical experience, and their triumphs are lionized, while the history ofthe
failures is forgotten or considered untypical.
The first step in rectifying resulting misinterpretations has usually been to
examine a population offirms defined ex ante. For this essay I have extended
Schmitz's work (1995) to generalize about the global industrial giants of1912.
While there are no doubt still some omissions, I believe the amended list in
appendix A includes almost all the industrial (i.e., mining and manufacturing)2
firms in the world with an equity market capitalization3 of$26 million or more
in 1912. These were large firms even by today's standards: the largest (U.S.
Steel) employed 221,025 workers in 1912; other firms on the list typically em-
ployed more than 10,000.4 They were also, generally, firms that had already
stood the test of time, being on average thirty-two years old in the corporate
sense, and often much longer established as partnerships or earlier private
firms. They were not the outcome of temporary stock market bubbles: these
were the survivors of a brutal shakeout process after the global turn-of-the-
century stock market booms and merger waves, in which many giants with
watered stock but few capabilities had drastically declined (Livermore 1935;
Lamoreaux 1984; Hannah 1974; Tilly 1982; Samber 1996). They were, on the
whole, firms that contemporary stockmarket analysts considered attractive and
safe because of their consistently reliable record of generous but sustainable
1. Harris Corporation (1996) shows that 39 percent ofthe Fortune U.S. top 500 are more than
100 years old and a further 50 percent were founded between the 1880s and 1920s. The oldest
American firm in the 1912 list, Lorillard and Company, can be traced back to 1760. European
firms are, of course, generally older: some (relatively small) modern firms had medieval origins
and the large French firm St. Gobain can plausibly be traced back to the mid-seventeenth century,
though it did not take modern corporate form until the nineteenth century.
2. The study is confined to these sectors because they most clearly approximate to being glob-
ally competitive in the twentieth century and I wish to test how corporate evolution in such mar-
kets works. .
3. A few giant companies (mainly American and German and often family-owned) had no
quoted equity capital in 1912; I have taken total balance-sheet assets, net of any bonded debt, or
similar proxies for equity market capitalization in such cases. I have also treated Western Electric
(which had recently become a subsidiary ofAT&T) in this way. All nationalized or substantially
state-owned firms of 1912 have been excluded.
4. These employmentfigures are provided only for illustrative purposes. Becausethe population
is defined by a capital measure (equity market capitalization), some firms in capital-intensive in-
dustries will be included but employ under 10,000. Employment data is more readily available for
British and German firms than for other countries: see, e.g., Shaw (1983), Kocka and Siegrist
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dividends (Meyer 1910, 196). A population of the largest firms of ten years
earlier would almost certainly show earlier exits and faster rates of decline
than this population ofmaturing Giant Redwoods.
In order to assess their propensity to decline or develop, it was necessary to
devise a comparable measure of the size of the 1912 firms in 1995. Equity
market capitalization is again available for survivors, but the comparison needs
to take account of inflation. The deflator I have used is U.S. stock market
prices, more specifically Standard and Poor's industrial 500 index. The rise in
U.S. stock prices (measured thus between 1912 and 1995 and averaging about
6 percent compounded per year) clearly partly reflects the declining value of
the dollar (averaging 4 percent peryear in 1912-95) but also some real growth.
It seems appropriate to use a deflator that also captures the fact that even firms
merely sustaining their market position would have participated in this growth,
which in the OEeD countries has, over the century as a whole, attained levels
just above 2 percent per annum, per capita, with some extensive growth in the
number ofindustrial workers also (Maddison 1989, 15).
One intuitive interpretation of the 1995 equity market capitalization, thus
revalued "at 1912 stockmarket prices;' is that itreflects the difference between
how the long-run strategy ofthe 1912 managers actually turned out and what
they would have left posterity ifthey had instead decided they had no distinc-
tive capabilities, retired, and handed their assets to a hypothetical index-
matching fund manager. Ifthe 1912 and 1995 values were found to be equal,
it would imply they would have lost nothing (except their managerial incomes)
ifthey had followed that path, while a ratio of 1995 to 1912 "size" below one
would suggest that giving up in 1912 would have been a better bet. A ratio
above one would suggest that, in the long-term, the firm's capabilities were
broadened (e.g., by extensive growth into wider geographic or product space)
or deepened (by adding new competitive advantages, perhaps from R&D, or
branding).
This appealing intuition should not be pressed too far, however. A sellout in
1912 of firms of this size, even where possible, would not necessarily have
been at the market price: breakup values were less than the going-concern val-
ues reflected in the market price; but takeover values could be higher. Equally
the ratio of 1995 to 1912 size should not be taken as a measure of investor
returns: that would require an analysis ofthe intervening dividends (and other
flows to and from shareholders), which could have been higher or lower than
Standard and Poor's average. In principle, investor returns could be better even
if no firm existed at the end: a monopoly well-milked is better for investors
than a residue ofunprofitable corporate assets. By, the same token, a firm may
have been under bankruptcy protection, severely compromising its equity in-
vestors' assets, but still remain large-scale, reflecting its other capabilities
rather than temporary financial mismanagement or ill luck. A recent example
is Texaco, which was under bankruptcy protection in 1987, but still retains
significant capabilities and, by our measure, is the fifth-best performer of the257 Marshall's "Trees" and the Global "Forest"
hundred 1912 giants. Several German firms have also had parallel experiences
in their frequently disrupted and dismembered national past. Our concern is
not the outcome for investors, but rather the survival, development, or decline
of capabilities embodied in the firm. In that spirit we are primarily interested
in the "size" ofthe 1995 firm relative to that of 1912: the 1912 firm's adjusted
1995 stock market value reflects in some sense whether the "lump ofcorporate
capability," defined by the boundaries ofthe firm, has grown or declined.
Of course that size will have been affected by many factors other than its
assets in 1912 and the skill with which its 1912 managers then deployed them.5
Market position and scale often conferred first-mover advantages, butthe com-
petitive process was one ofcontinuous movement, not just initial position: the
capabilities needed (and their potential usefulness in the marketplace) natu-
rally were transformed over time. New corporate resources were also added,
not just in ways indirectly captured in our stock exchange price·deflator (e.g.,
reinvested profits), but by new capital issues or new stock issued for firms
acquired (and acquisition activity was one to which many ofthese firms were
strongly prone). By implication, we assume all of Unilever's "organizational
capability" came from the British half (Lever Brothers) not the Dutch half
(Margarine Unie) with which itmerged in 1929, while Du Pont's stock ofskills
implicitly came entirely from its chemical rather than oil-company (Conoco)
heritage. Because ofshares issued to finance such mergers and acquisitions or
to finance internal expansion, shareholders probably did worse than our mea-
sure ofchanges in the "lump ofmanagerial capability" suggests.6 In that sense,
adopting a ratio of one between the 1995 and 1912 values as the threshold
defining corporate capability enhancement (rather than decline) should be con-
sidered a very weak test, biased in favor ofdiagnosing corporate growth. I will
be making simple, comparative, long-run judgments, and my choice of defla-
tors and benchmarks is usually biased against the hypothesis being tested.
A major problem remains for firms that disappeared by liquidation, acquisi-
tion, or nationalization. The treatment ofthese firms is more fully discussed in
appendix A, but for the most common case-acquisition-the best estimate
ofits capability enhancement seemed to be the price paid at the time ofacquisi-
tion, converted (as with 1995 survivor values) to 1912 stock exchange prices.
Since acquired firms were generally declining, but taken over at a premium,
this probably gives an upward bias to the results.7
5. For that reason, I would expect correlations between 1912 size and 1995 outcomes to be very
low; but since much has been made in the literature offirst-mover advantages, dynamic increasing
returns, and the sustainability ofcore corporate capabilities, it is worth defining the extent of the
phenomenon more precisely.
6. E.g., four ofthese firms appear on a list ofthe top ten firms that destroyed shareholder value
by overinvesting in the 1980s (Jensen 1993).
7. The average terminal ratio of surviving firms was three times that of acquired ones, and
firms acquired prior to 1950 had twice the ratio of firms acquired after 1950. See table 7.1 and
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7.3 Did Giant Firms Grow or Decline (1912-1995)?
Four-fifths ofthe giant companies in the 1912 list were based in the major
industrial countries of their day: Germany, Britain, and, above all, America,
which alone accounted for over half. They had amassed substantial assets-
physical, human, and/or reputational-to become the largest corporations
globally. Most had distinctive accumulations ofskills, architectures ofinternal
orexternal relationships, first-mover advantages, economies ofscale, scope, or
experience, or technological leads, of a kind that asymmetrically endowed
them with competitive advantages over other firms. That these were in many
cases the outcome of a path-dependent (and difficult to replicate) process of
organizational learning is also clear. The parables of learning that we have
told8 are prominently represented among the 1912 giants, and they could be
replicated many times over. They includeWestinghouseAir Brake, whose mar-
ket power over its railroad customers-then the dominant transportation pro-
viders-derived from network standard setting in which exclusive private
ownership (at least in the days before Microsoft) was not common. Some-
including Shell, Jersey Standard (Exxon), and Rio Tinto (RTZ)-derived mar-
ket power from control of raw material resources or distribution networks,
or-like Eastman Kodak or Siemens-from popularizing new technologies.
Others-like Guinness, Procter and Gamble, and Lever Brothers-had pion-
eered branded products in mass urban markets.
The business-history literature understandably focuses on companies such
as these which, because they have been sustained successes, remain familiar to
us today. There is, however, a danger in this perspective ofdeveloping a some-
what Panglossian view ofgiant corporations as repositories ofcapabilities that
are self-sustaining. Indeed, their long-run success easily reinforces the stronger
view that such corporations were able to entrench their existing market posi-
tion and developed organizational routines that reinforced what they had al-
ready learned, creating dynamic, learning organizations that would, through
geographic (often multinational) expansion, through diversification into new
product markets, or through the institutionalization of innovation by R&D,
constantly expand the ambit of their capabilities. That some firms-Procter
and Gamble, Du Pont, Shell, Siemens, and others-did so is undoubtedly true,
but how typical were they? That question is rarely answered in relation to a
population defined at the start of the process, rather than by the remembered
survivors.
Yet who now remembers German giants of 1912 like Hohenlohe Iron and
Steel, British ones like Metropolitan Carriage,., or U.S. ones like Central
Leather, the Utah Copper and Nevada Consolidated group, or Cudahy Pack-
ing? And when firms that have drastically declined, like U.S. Steel and Ohio
8. E.g., Usselman (chap. 2 in this volume) for Westinghouse Air Brake, Samber (1996) for
Pittsburgh firms, Genesove and Mullin (chap. 3 in this volume) for American Sugar, Lamoreaux
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Table 7.1 Summary Measures of Long-Run Performance ofthe Hundred
Largest Firms of1912 by 1995
Outcomes
Survives in top hundt:~d
Survives and larger in 1995 than in 1912
Experiences bankruptcy or similara
Larger in 1995 or on earlier exit than in 1912

















Source: Author's calculations from data in appendix A.
alncluding liquidation, bankruptcy protection, extensive corporate breakup, or nationalization.
blncluding all exiting firms at their disappearance ratio.
clncluding all exit values and terminal values, the unweighted mean value is 1.4 and the mean
weighted by 1912 values is 1.2; ifall exits are valued at 0, the unweighted mean value falls to 1.1
and the weighted mean to 1.0. The average terminal ratio ofthe fifty-two survivors in 1995 is 2.0;
that ofthe forty-eight disappearances is 0.6.
Oil (now combined as USX Marathon), are remembered, it is usually as exem-
plars oftheir failure to expand their capabilities, as elephants that did not learn
to dance in a world in which corporations (if they are wise or well-advised)
normally do.
Our 1912 population-and our tracking ofthe outcomes by 1995-enable
us to judge how typical the firms we remember are, relative to those we have
largely forgotten. Is it easy to expand corporate capability (whether at the ter-
minal date of 1995 or by earlier exit at a respectable size) or are cumulative
corporate learning and capability expansion difficult tricks for giant firms to
pull off? Table 7.1 indicates that the typical firm declined: nearly a halfofthem
disappeared and more than a quarter experienced bankruptcy or a similar close
shave with it. The modal value ofthe capability expansion ratios is zero, while
the median company registers 0.4, that is, it was only 40 percent of its 1912
size at the terminal date. Yet the distribution is highly skew, with the firms
that we remember, particularly the three spectacularperformers-BurmahlBP,
Procter and Gamble, and Du Pont, with capability expansion ratios above7-
rescuing the mean performance, which, depending on the assumptions made,
was between 1.0 and 1.4. Just over half the firms survived and just over half
these survivors grew; indeed a number ofthem did sufficiently well to remain
in a similar list ofthe hundred largest firms today.9
9. To outrank the hundredth-ranked firm in the 1995 giant industrials, the lowest-ranked firm of
1912 would have had to achieve a ratio of4.0. The average giant firm of 1912 would have had to260 Leslie Hannah
Yet for the 1912 top hundred overall, the record was not impressive. Not
only was decline twice as common as growth, but mean capability expansion
ratios slightly above 1 imply that, if these giants issued new capital to share-
holders or to pay for firms acquired in 1912-95, as many of them did abun-
dantly, they did notably worse than the average company in Standard and
Poor's index. The minority of growth-oriented firms that dominate the litera-
ture are by no means typical. The low median value ofthe ratio suggests that
most giant firms are incapable over a long period of sustaining their initial
endowment ofcapabilities. However, a significant group offirms achieves ra-
tios between 1.0 and 9.1, implying that some giants could create new capabili-
ties, in addition to those they manifestly inherited, an arguably more challeng-
ing task.
To extend Marshall's analogy ofthe population offirms as the "trees ofthe
forest," the Giant Redwoods among them were in the long run prone to death
and decline. Economists are notoriously shy about defining what they mean by
the long run, butit is certainly a shorter time in economics than in silviculture:
we are talking about corporate "redwoods" with a distinct propensity to die
over decades, not the centuries of their natural cousins. The "quarter-life" of
the 1912 giants (i.e., the time taken for a quarter ofthem to disappear in bank-
ruptcy, nationalization, or merger) was thirty-three years, and they are, as we
approach the millennium, now hovering around their half-life. 1O The time
elapsed since 1912-eight decades or so-is not much longer than the busi-
ness "half-life" of a single human being,l1 though, ofcourse, personally man-
aged businesses generally had much shorter average lifespans than this. Small
firms certainly have shorter average lives than giant firms12_it usually takes
longer to walk down a mountain than to roll offa hillock-but both large and
grow to 2.7 times its 1912 size to achieve the average size of the 1995 top hundred, from $81
million to $218 million in 1912 stock exchange prices. The nineteen 1912 giant firms that were
still in the 1995 global top one hundred achieved an average ratio of 3.8, though one of them
(RTZ) managed to stay in with a ratio as low as 0.8 (falling from thirteenth place to eighty-eighth).
10. Fifty-two ofthe 1912 top hundred firms still formally exist independently, though arguably
some-e.g., Singer (Bicoastal) and U.S. Rubber (Uniroyal)-are so small that they are as good
as disappeared. The problem of reincarnation also complicates the calculation: paradoxically
rather more 1912 giant firms still existed in 1950 than earlier, in 1945 (largely because of the
breakup ofIG Farben and Vereinigte Stahlwerke, which in the 1920s had absorbed half the Ger-
man giants of 1912); similarly at least two firms (Nabisco and Imperial Tobacco) are about to be
demerged from their recently acquired parents at the time of writing. Because of such reincarna-
tions, it is wrong to conclude from the longer interval between the quarter-life (1912-45) and the
half-life (-1999?) that the rate of disappearance declines over time, though, in the limit, that will
become true. Moreover, ifeconomic evolution is Lamarckian rather than Darwinian (and the pro-
cess of corporate learning clearly implies that), we might eX'pect organizational death rates to
decline with age; see, e.g., Hannan and Freeman (1984). In calculating half-lives ofgiant firms I
have assumed they were born giants in 1912, rather than when founded as small firms.
11. Demographers do not conventionally use the concept ofhalf-life to describe life expectancy,
but in advanced industrial economies the half-life of an eighteen-year old male would be about
fifty years; see Registrar General (1914), table 3.
12. Most studies of new, small firms show a half-life in very low single digits. At the time
Marshall began writing, English joint stock companies had a half-life ofabout seven years (Shan-
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small firms commonly die. They differ only in the length of time they take
and, even in that respect, by surprisingly little: to raise ajoint-stockcompany's
half-life by one year, it is necessary to increase its size by twenty-three times. 13
The proposition that it would be possible to fritter away $3 billion (much less
$90 billion) in a human lifetime is one I personally find daunting, but business
leaders are evidently made of sterner stuff. $3 billion is the value (in 1995
stock exchange prices) that the market placed on the smallest of these firms'
"lump ofcapabilities" in 1912 (and $90 billion that ofthe largest); yet overall
these firms barely increased their value; many had decimated it or dissipated it
completely. The supposedly exceptional turbulence in corporate rankings (now
modishly asserted by businessmen to have followed the liberalization ofworld
trade, oil crises, unprecedentedly rapid technical change, and the spread of
industrialization) is in fact also observed in the earlier periods of increasing
national autarky and relative economic stagnation. Corporate dinosaurs are
ubiquitous in an ever-changing world. As the old English music hall joke had
it: Q. How do I build a successful small firm? A. Easily! Buy a large one
and wait!
One interpretation ofthe strong tendency to stagnation or decline would be
that it was the rational strategy ofdominant firms pursuing shareholder profit
maximization, a point argued for U.S. Steel's early decline by Stigler (1968).
Rather than set an entry-preventing price, it may be sensible for dominant firms
to milk their monopoly position while yielding market share to competitors.
This was particularly likely where it helped firms appear respectable to anti-
trust authorities, especially when rivals thus indulged respected price levels.
Casual inspection ofthe business histories ofthe declining firms in this popula-
tion suggests that planned decline was rarely their explicit objective, though it
may have been implicit in their muddled reactions. We have not investigated
overall stockholder returns, but the general impression in these companies'
histories is ofdepressed profits desperately usedby managements to paperover
the cracks ofdeclining capabilities, not ofgenerosity to stockholders during a
preplanned yielding to competitors of market share they could not have ex-
pected to keep. Stigler's hypothesis could clearly be investigated further, but it
appears unlikely to account for more than a small proportion of the 1912
giants' propensity to reduce their size. 14
The implications of these observations for industrial economists are clear.
While we naturally focus on success-oncorporations that did learn to expand
13. In the range between the average English joint stock company and the average global 1912
giant firm. Around 1885, joint stock companies, whose half-lives are referred to in note 12, aver-
aged paid-up capital of about £60,000 (Jeffreys 1938, 130), compared with equity market values
averaging £16.6 million in the 1912 global top hundred, a ratio of about 1:275. Their half-lives
were in the ratio 1:12.
14. Even in Stigler's study (.1968) of U.S. Steel, the returns to its stockholders peaked in real
terms ten years after the merger, that is, in 1911, and U.S. Steel stockholders did worse on average
than other steel companies for the remainder of his analysis (1912-25), which covers the period
of this study. The impression of U.S. Steel post-1925 is also not very favorable to an extension
forward in time ofthe Stigler hypothesis.262 Leslie Hannah
or sustain their capabilities-this is not something that giant managerial hier-
archies have normally been very good at. In fact the alleged twentieth-century
tendency to increased industrial concentration is by no means universal or sus-
tained in all national markets (Hannah 1995a), and probably is quite mild on a
global basis also.
The implications for the parables that business historians tell and for under-
standing individual corporate evolution are that we should be as sensitive to
the sources oferoding capabilities as oftheirbuilding. Corporations can forget
as well as learn; their inherited learning can become redundant (or even dys-
functional) in a changed environment; "first-mover" advantages appear fleet-
ing; supposedly distinctive capabilities can be replicated or improved upon by
competitorfirms. 15 Such outcomes appearto be twice as common as successful
expansion ofcapabilities for giant corporations.
Clearly ifwe could distinguish ex ante what determines how firms can beat
the normal form and do well, we could change the balance ofeconomic evolu-
tion and (presumably) become very rich men. The reader will not, then, be
surprised that it is in fact very difficult to do so, and that those who have so far
been brave enough to attempt it are quite unconvincing. While this population
offirms is not large enough-given the variability ofoutcomes-to generate
many statistically significant results,16 it does enable us at least to call in ques-
tion some generic recipes for corporate success, even those generated with
hindsight. If ex post "prediction" is difficult, we can be reasonably certain
that ex ante prediction will pose a few problems; the strategic management
consultants we should most respect are the modest ones.
7.4 National Differences in Corporate Performance
Perhaps the most widely used systematic model of corporate failure is
Chandler's invocation of Britain's failure to develop professionally managed
corporate hierarchies as a reason for Britain's twentieth-century economic de-
cline, relative to Germany and the United States (Chandler 1990). This thesis
is appealingly grounded in a compelling argument about corporate capability,
but its vigorously stated comparative perspectives are vulnerable from a num-
berofangles (Kleinschmidt and Welskopp 1993;Alford 1994; Hannah 1995a).
Our population of Giant Redwoods certainly provides no support for the hy-
15. See, e.g., Raff and Temin (chap. 6 in this volume), Hounshell (chap. 5 in this volume), and,
more generally, Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) and Henderson and Clark (1990).
16. Why not, then, increase the size ofthe sample? Because.~his is not a sample; it is (or is very
close to being) the whole population ofgiant firms in 1912. Though inclusion ofvery large firms
in the $15-$25 million range would be possible, that suffers from the same problem as the econo-
metrics of national growth rates and convergence (do we really want Iceland to have the same
weight as the United States?). The truth is that, for assessing corporate or national performance,
the world has not generated enough human experience for us to generalize econometrically. Disci-
plined parables are a more realistic scholarly objective. For some indication of the likely results
ofadding firms in a lower size range to the study, note 21 below.263 Marshall's "Trees" and the Global "Forest"
Table 7.2 National Performance Differentials of 1912 Giants
U.S. Germany Britain Other
No. offirms headquartered there in 1912 54 14 15a 17a
Average equity capitalization in 1912
(millions ofdollars) 90 59 95 56
Outcomes (%)
Survival in top hundred 1995 17 29 47 0
Any independent survival 48 57 60 53
Proportion showing positive growth
(i.e., ratios above 1.0) 26 43 40 18
"Capability enhancement"b
Unweighted average
C 1.5 1.2 1.9 0.5
Coefficient ofvariation (135) (104) (123) (164)
Medianc 0.4 0.6 1.3 0
Source: Author's calculations, from appendix A data.
aCounting Royal Dutch Shell as wholly British.
bDefined as terminal equity capitalization -;- 1912 equity capitalization.
clncluding exits.
pothesis that large British firms were less likely to sustain their capabilities
than German and American ones; indeed, the reverse is true. As table 7.2
shows, British firms were most likely to survive, most likely to remain in the
top hundred, and generated higher performance ratios than American or Ger-
man ones, however measured. I?
Nearly halfthe British giants of 1912 survived, but less than a fifth in other
countries overall. Germany came nearest to Britain, with a 29 percent survival
ratio for its 1912 giants; however, Germany seriously lagged in building new
giant firms in the twentieth century, an activity in which the United States ex-
celled. 18 Of the new giant firms entering the top hundred after 1912 and still
there by 1995, the United States built 50 percent more even than Japan, which
had no giant firms in the 1912 top hundred list buttwenty-one by 1995. Europe
generally built fewer new giants than the United States or Japan, but within
Europe, it was Britain, not Germany, that stood out, both as a builder of new
giant firms and a sustainer ofexisting ones.
17. The use ofthe U.S. rather than the British stock exchange index (which rose by less) as the
deflator biases the results against British-based firms.
18. Between 1912 and 1995 the German representation in the top hundred halved from 14 to 7
because it created only 3 "new" giant firms to replace its declining firms. The United States' share
fell proportionately less, from 54 to 40, because, despite its standing as the worst performer ofthe
three leaders in table 7.2, it created 31 "new" giant firms. Between 1912 and 1995 Britain's share
ofthe world's giant firms declined least ofthe three, from 15 to 14 (if the 1 Anglo-Dutch firm of
1912 and the 3 of 1995 are counted as entirely British), not only because it had more survivors
than Germany but also because it created more new giant firms than Germany in the course ofthe
century (though proportionately fewer than the United States). The 1995 data is from an unpub-
lished study by the author, based on the industrial firms in Business Week's listing of the world's
giant firms on 31 May 1995 by equity market capitalization.264 Leslie Hannah
These results invite speculation on whether entrenched oligopolists weaken
rather than strengthen the national economies in which they are headquartered.
Some postwar international comparisons (Geroski and Jacquemin 1988; Ger-
oski and Mueller 1996) suggest that the stability of dominant firm positions
exhibited in the British case is associated with poor national economic perfor-
mance, and this reinforces the traditional economist's emphasis on market as-
sortment rather than persisting corporate capabilities as a source ofefficiency
gains.
However, a more benign interpretation is possible for the British Giant Red-
woods in the 1912 population, consisting as they did of giants that had estab-
lished their global status in competitive conditions before World War I, rather
than in Britain's more sclerotic phase ofpost-1932 protectionism and carteliza-
tion (Broadberry and Crafts 1992). The British giant corporations arguably had
more staying power because in 1912 they were domiciled in a free-trade coun-
try, whileAmerican giant corporations were already then substantially overpro-
tected by high tariffs and German ones moderately so (Capie 1994,59). British
1912 capabilities were thus already disciplined by more stringent (because
more global) market tests. British giant corporations also tended already to
spread an unusually high proportion of their corporate resources globally.
Since perhaps a third ofthe British giant corporations' activities were located
overseas in 1912, probably twice as much as the average American or German
giant corporation at that time (Hannah 1996), they were less constrained by
their home market performance and already more fitted to compete globally.
Another explanation ofthe poor U.S. performance could be that U.S. firms
were inhibited by antitrust laws from expanding, earlier and more seriously
than their German and British counterparts. Antitrust laws clearly did restrain
the smaller U.S. giants from some acquisitions, yet some ofthe best U.S. per-
formers were vigorous independent companies deriving from antitrust action,
notably the 1911 breakup of Standard Oil and Du Pont, while the 1912 giant
that was "lucky" not to be broken up, U.S. Steel, then performed abysmally
both in absolute terms and relative to the industry average. 19Antitrust enforce-
ment thus had positive as well as negative effects on U.S. corporate giants.
Moreover, European firms were subject to parallel constraints from national-
ization or expropriation: the British firm Vickers, for example, saw its assets
in cars, computers, aircraft, and shipbuilding eventually nationalized, and RTZ
lost its core assets (in Spain) to Franco's postwar nationalization program. Ger-
man firms suffered from extensive nationalizations in the 1930s,20 and German
giants sustained massive expropriations, in both 1914-19 and 1939-45, ofsub-
19. The later demerger ofNorthern Telecom from Western Electric also performed well, as did
the 1914 British company split ofBurmah (later Burmah Castrol) and Anglo-Persian (later BP).
Even the four companies demerged from American Tobacco in 1911 achieved an average perfor-
mance of0.7, compared with the only independent tobacco company's performance of0.5.
20. Nationalization was the greatest risk in the "other" countries, which performed worst; see
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sidiaries in enemy countries and beyond their shrinking western and eastern
national borders. Giant corporations faced large and diverse political risks
wherever they were based in a turbulent century; but the best firms were the
ones that turned this to their advantage; no nation had a monopoly of severe
challenges to big business.
My results thus decisively reject the notion that there were exceptionally
few large British corporations or that they were especially notable for failing
to sustain ordevelop theircapabilities; and acase can be made that the opposite
is true. Certainly matched pairs of roughly equal British and American firms
appear to confirm this: in oil Shell did more than twice as well as Exxon and
by 1995 was the largest industrial firm in the world; in tobacco, BAT did three
times as well as American Tobacco; in textiles, J&P Coats did three times as
well as American Woolen; in copper, RTZ did three times as well as Phelps
Dodge. Even when oneAmerican firm did markedly better than its British twin
(e.g., Du Pont did three times as well as Brunner Mond [Zeneca]), the superior
U.S. performance was cancelled out by U.S. firms in the same industry that
declined markedly (e.g., American Agricultural Chemical and Virginia-
Carolina Chemical).
Ofcourse, the British success could simply be the outcome ofrandom varia-
tions in the performance of a relatively small number of firms. What is clear
is that the leading industrial countries all had some significant capabilities in
managing leading corporations. There are strong indications that Britain's firms
slightly lower down in the size range of moderately large corporations also
show a clear tendency to outperform Germany and the United States, though
the data on these are less standardized and relate to changing populations of
firms. 21
It is abundantly clear, then, that Chandler was wrong in identifying the fail-
ure to entrench oligopolies in manufacturing corporations as the key to Brit-
ain's fundamental twentieth-century weaknesses. Paradoxically, the country
that best exemplifies the Chandlerian thesis about dynamic and sustained cor-
porate capabilities is Britain, the country where he least expected to find it. Yet
this conclusion leaves an unresolved puzzle. British GDP by 1995 was only
four times in real terms its 1912 level, while the United States and Germany
achieved twice this rate of growth.22 The well-known statistics that first fo-
cused Chandler's attention on manufacturing as the root cause ofBritain's slow
21. Teece (1993, 214) noted that in Chandler's own data on the top 200 firms in each country,
leading German firms had a low probability ofmaintaining their position, though he was inclined
to excuse it as the effect of war at the 1953 benchmark date for Germany. But Cassis (1997)
observes that the poor German performance persists in longer-run comparisons with the longevity
of large British and French firms. See also Hannah (1995a). Table 7.4 also suggests that large
British firms were faster than continental European ones in adopting what Chandler defined as
appropriate structures, despite the contrary impression in Scale and Scope.
22. The United States' GDP increased eight times, and Germany's nine times, bothin real terms.
All countries grew both by increasing labor productivity and by increasing the population, but the
latter kind ofgrowth was most noticeable in the United States and least in Britain.266 Leslie Hannah
growth are still eloquent: Britain's share of world trade in manufactures de-
clined more rapidly than that of Germany, while America's share actually
rose.23 The proportion ofBritain's labor force in manufacturing fell markedly
relative to Germany.24 If large British industrial firms were not generally per-
forming badly, it seems reasonable to examine whether smaller and medium-
sizedmanufacturing firms in Britain were in some sense underperforming rela-
tive to those in the United States and Germany. If this alternative hypothesis
were nearer the mark, we would expect the decline in British manufacturing
to be reflected especially among smaller firms,. while, if the Chandler view
were correct, it would be the larger firms that had suffered most. The industrial
concentration data supports the former hypothesis: Britain has become sig-
nificantly more reliant on its large firms than either the United States or Ger-
many (though in the first decades of this century the United States was prob-
ably the leader); Britain now has the highest levels ofindustrial concentration
of any major modem economy.25 The statistical record of industrial structure
and performance is consistent with the view that the capabilities embodied in
Germany's midsized Miltelstand or in the vigorous competitive fringe ofsmall
and medium-sized firms in Germany and America are what have given them
their competitive edge in manufacturing; the data simply are not compatible
with the Chandler view of changing national competitive advantage of these
countries' large firms and those ofBritain. Far from neglecting to develop the
core capabilities of its large corporations, Britain seems to have done so pro-
portionately more than its two main industrial rivals over the century as a
whole.
There are, moreover, strong indications that it is a mistake to focus the
debate on changing national competitive advantage solely on the manufactur-
ing sector. Indeed, on Broadberry's estimates, between 1909-11 and 1990 Brit-
ain improved its manufacturing productivity performance relative to both
the United States and Germany.26 Some ofthis is arguably due to the reversal
since 1979 of the British government's former promanufacturing, pro-large-
23. Britain's share ofworld manufactured exports declined from 30 percent in 1912 to 9 percent
in 1991, while Germany's fell only from 26 percent to 20 percent; the United States' rose from
13 percent to 17 percent over the same period (Tyszynski 1951, 286; Central Statistical Office
1992, 142).
24. The share of manufacturing in total employment fell slightly faster between 1910-13 and
1990 in Britain (from 32 percent to 20 percent) than in the United States (from 22 percent to 15
percent), while in Germany the manufacturing share was stable at around 30 percent of employ-
ment (Broadberry 1996).
25. By 1970/71 the largest one hundred manufacturing firms controlled 40 percent ofnet output
in the United Kingdom, 33 percent in the United States, and perhaps only 30 percent in Germany;
around the First World War, concentration had been lower in Bntain than in the United States and
about the same as in Germany (Hannah 1995b, 58).
26. U.S. manufacturing productivity in manufacturing was 103 percent higher than the United
Kingdom's in 1909-11 but only 75 percent higher by 1990; German manufacturing productivity
was 19 percent higher than the United Kingdom's in 1911 and only 8 percent higher (in West
Germany alone) by 1990 (Broadberry 1996). Of course, productivity in East Germany is now
markedly lower than in either Britain or West Germany.267 Marshall's "Trees" and the Global "Forest"
corporation stance; the encouragementofsmall-firm growth by small-business
programs, similar to those adopted earlier in the United States and Germany;
and the espousal ofa morefree-market and free-trade policy stance that Britain
had championed in 1912 but soon, along with other countries, abandoned for
interventionist policies.
In that changing environment, the long-run decline ofBritish manufacturing
employment and exports is less worrying than might at first appear. As Britain
latterly became self-sufficient in oil, it had less need ofmanufacturing exports
to pay for oil imports than Germany or the United States (i.e., it moved nearer
to the United States' position in 1912, as a net oil exporter achieving only low
manufacturing exports). This is not to say Britain had no economic troubles:
its living standards have fallen relative to Germany and the United States in
the twentieth century. Yet careful sectoral analysis ofthe components ofgrowth
suggests that some of this was inevitable (Britain had already industrialized
more than the United States and Germany in 1912, so had far less scope for
overall productivity improvement by shifting resources out of agriculture),
while insofar as any British sectorfell behind its rivals, it appears to have been,
not manufacturing, but services, particularly the utilities and communications
sectors, in which America has done markedly better than Britain.27
7.5 Are There "Sunset" and "Sunrise" Industries
or "Sunset" and "Sunrise" Firms?
The various industries in which the giant firms of 1912 were concentrated
appear at first sight to have exhibited more consistent patterns ofperformance
than their nationality.28 As table 7.3 shows, about half the firms are in five
industries-coal mining, textiles and leather, nonferrous metals (including
othermining), iron and steel (including relatedheavy industries), and mechani-
cal engineering-in which the average firm had substantially declined in size
at the terminal date; very few giant firms increased in size, and only one (RTZ)
remained in the 1995 top hundred. The "successes" in these "old" industries29
27. The U.S. productivity lead over Britain in utilities was only 50 percent in 1909-11 but 290
percent by 1990; Germany's lead was 4 percent in 1909-11 and 30 percent in 1990. Britain's
transportation and communications sector has, however, had a better productivity record relative
to Germany (Broadberry 1996).
28. Though the poor performance of Germany and "other" in table 7.2, relative to Britain, is
partly due to their having a higher proportion oftheir giant firms in the "old" industries. Germany
was strong in two "new" industries (electrical engineering and chemicals) but had no giant firms
in either petroleum or branded products. (Britain had old industries but they were generally orga-
nized on the basis of Marshallian industrial districts, with external economies substituting for
economies of scale internal to large firms.) However, America's poor performance cannot be ex-
plained by industrial composition: it had the same proportion of giant firms in "new" industries
as Britain.
29. Ofcourse they were often considered important and significant industries at the time: rail-
road manufacturers were then bigger than car manufacturers; gold, diamond, and copper mines
were felt to have excellent prospects, as were high-tech armaments and ship manufacturers. They
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often achieved it by selling out early (e.g., the railroad-equipment manufac-
turer, Metropolitan Carriage, in 1919 with a ratio of 1.9); others succeeded in
their core old activities as well as new ones (e.g., Mannesmann, with the best
ratio for this group ofindustries of2.7 in 1995). A few well-performing survi-
vors shifted industry completely: for example, American Can into financial
services (with a ratio of1.9)and the French steel giant Schneiderinto electrical
engineering (achieving the stability ratio of 1.0). Such "new" industries un-
doubtedly offeredbettergrowth opportunities but, ofcourse, many ofthe "old"
1912 industries did not have any relevant capabilities to transfer to such new
industries in order to escape constraints in individual markets. Judging from
giant firms in coal, textiles, and railroad-equipment manufacture, the collapse
oftheir markets and the limitations on interindustry transfer oftheir capabili-
ties posed particularly tough obstacles. The most promising solution for such
firms may have been the absorption into otherfirms that many ofthem suffered,
presumably to maximize the value of what few transferable skills they still
embodied.3D By the same token, firms that were in 1912 already in the rapidly
growing industries ofpetroleum, chemicals, and electrical engineering (indus-
tries whose giant firms more than doubled in real size on average) perhaps had
a somewhat easier task in converting their initial stock of skills and building
dynamic capabilities. Branded products firms-the most numerous of the
"new" industries in the 1912 list-also tended to grow on average.
However, it would be wrong to suggest that giant firms had clearly predes-
tined outcomes depending on their initial "sunrise" or "sunset" industry base.
In fact, there was more diversity ofperformance within industries than between
them.31 Even in an industry as promising as electrical manufacturing-where
three out of five firms scored above 3.3-Westinghouse (0.7) and AEG (0.3)
performed weakly. Oil companies overall did well, but relative laggards, when
nationalized or taken over, could be below their 1912 size. The branded-
product firms include some ofthe great twentieth-century successes like Pro-
cter and Gamble (8.1) and Lever Brothers (Unilever) (3.4) but also some of
the more remarkable failures like American TobaccolBrands (0.4) and Cudahy
Packing (0.1). In industries where decline was the typical outcome-like the
steel and related engineering industries-not all had to go the way of U.S.
Steel (0.1), International Harvester (0.1), and Krupp (0.2); Gewerkschaft
deutscher Kaiser (Thyssen) (0.9) and John Deere and Company (0.9) did dis-
tinctly better. As the last column of table 7.3 shows, both old and new indus-
30. U.S. coal firms were absorbed into firms like Du Pont; in Europe the post-1945 solution
was nationalization (Britain's National Coal Board and Charbonnages de France) orpublicly subsi-
dized private corporations (Ruhrkohle in Germany): a solution that seems more often to have
expensively delayed decline than facilitated diversification or skill transfer.
31. The coefficient of variation of the average ratios for the nine industries is 95; thus there is
more variation within the majority of the industry groups (coal, mechanical engineering, nonfer-
rous metals, etc., iron and steel, and branded products) than between industry groups and, within
the four less variable groups (textiles, chemicals, electrical engineering, and petroleum), there is
still almost as much variability as there is between industry groups.270 Leslie Hannah
tries showed considerable variability of growth outcomes: the coefficient of
variation exceeded 60 in all industries and exceeded 100 in halfofthem. This
pattern ofdiversity ofexperience within industries is consistent with the pat-
tern revealed by wider samples offirms over shorterperiods (e.g., Schmalensee
1985; Rumelt 1991). Dynamic economies-of which the global economy in
which most of these firms in varying degrees operated is the largest case-
indeed consist of rising and declining industries, but businesses can develop
and sustain competitive advantages in either kind ofindustry. Simplistic reci-
pes for industry portfolio management may have earned consultants fortunes,
but a surer key to sustained success is learning to operate distinctively and
profitably anywhere, rather than paying expensively for fashionable diversify-
ing acquisitions in industries in which no distinctive new proprietor value can
be added (Kay 1993).
How, then, can large corporations retain their positions, continue to add
value, and expand their capabilities? The only reasonable answer is: with great
difficulty. Samuel Johnson's view, that "business could not be managed by
those who manage itifit had much difficulty," has often appealed to academic
analysts and is probably true ofthe generality ofbusinesses; but the generality
ofbusinesses-in the short or long term depending on their initial size-are
dead. It is a pleasant conceit of us all-from business-school professors,
through academic analysts to management consultants-that the world would
be a better place ifsystematic analysis could change that. Given the high inci-
dence and costs ofcorporate decline and failure-and the distance ofthe spec-
ter ofglobal domination by a few exceptionally competent firms-it is doubt-
less in the social (as well as the private) interest that all possible steps should
be taken to encourage such systematic analysis. To date, however, we have
made great strides in storytelling, but a clearer, surer recipe for sustained suc-
cess for large corporations has remained elusive.
This outcome is not accidental: it is inherent in the competitive market pro-
cess that underpins the success of twentieth-century capitalism. Most of the
companies I have described were remarkable successes in 1912; their high
stockmarket valuation reflected their ability to earn supernormal profits. These
profits were often a rewardfor large-scale investments in production, manage-
ment, and marketing, along the lines described by Chandler (1990). There was
often something more-a technological advantage, exclusive possession of
raw materials or of valuable distribution networks, a strong brand image-to
entrench the position ofthe first movers in the Chandlerian sense. Yet, as Lieb-
erman and Montgomery (1988) have emphasized, such advantages are often
fleeting and contingent. Patents were oflimited effectiveness, advertising built
up rival brands, new mines and oil wells were discovered, techniques ofman-
agement, production, and marketing were copied. Even where this could not
easily happen, exogenous changes in the technology of production or in the
nature ofmarkets could make the initial advantage insecure; entrenched posi-271 Marshall's "Trees" and the Global "Forest"
tions could also be challenged by antitrust or by expropri.ations (both national-
izations and those following defeat in war).
Where such challenges were ineffective, or where they were neutralized by
the firms' own strategic initiatives, the giants survived, but, given the power of
competitive forces, it is arguably no surprise that disappearance or decline was
nearly three times more likely among the giants than growth. The process of
copying was one that often competed the profits ofthe onetime leaders down
to normal levels, spreading the benefits oftheir initial advantage more widely.
Firms that limited this process and maintained some competitive advantage
once could, in principle, have had a run offurther luck that enabled them con-
stantly to entrench new capabilities. A more plausible explanation ofcapability
enhancers is that they had some distinctive architecture that enabled them-
but not others-constantly to replicate their early success (Kay 1993). Such
corporate architectures must be complex and difficult to identify, describe, and
copy, for, if that were not the case, their value would be competed down by
emulators. By definition, we do not know what those architectures are, though
it is plausible that their corporate operators have acquired that knowledge
through a process ofcollective, tacit learning, transmissible between manage-
rial generations.
This points up starkly the catch-22 of their craft for all business historians
and management gurus. They naturally view that bleak scientific point skepti-
cally, as the fund manager views the financial economist's "efficient markets
hypothesis," with which it has close affinities.32 It is perfectly possible, in both
cases, to discover a generically effective strategy, but, when we do, its profit-
ability will be competed down by the emulation our discovery prompts. The
gold we have unearthed will very soon turn into the dross ofnormal profits, as
its benefits are widely spread, but the private dross represents the broad social
benefit ofexpanding average capabilities.
Both the incentive to develop competitive advantages and the incentive to
emulate them were strong in the societies in which the giant firms of 1912
operated.33 Large firms themselves became very efficient surveyors ofthe pos-
sibilities, increasingly competing with and emulating each other. In that sense,
the averagely weak ability oflarge firms to develop the distinctive capabilities
that had once generated their size is a sign, not oftheir individual weaknesses,
but oftheir collective strengths within the capitalist market system. Marx un-
derstood the "contradictions" in this dialectical system well. Paradoxically,
capitalist firms are induced by the search for surplus value (supernormal
profits) to grow; but competition between them also tends to destroy the dis-
32. And, as with stock picking, it is easier to give business-strategy advice retrospectively than
prospectively!
33. At least in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. The "other" countries-
many what we would now call "emerging markets"-actually show the worst performance in
table 7.2, perhaps reflecting that they did not have these social capabilities in such large measure.272 Leslie Hannah
tinctive sources of supernormal profits. Marx's mistake was to consider this a
weakness in the stage of economic evolution he then saw unfolding. In fact,
the mix ofincentives and checks it created has been capitalism's fundamental
strength as the (now globally favored) system ofsocial organization.
7.6 Which National Differences Were Most Sustainable?
If that view of the world is accepted, we might expect international differ-
ences among giant firms to diminish in all except a few cases of well-
entrenched or undiscoverable competitive advantages. We can see some ofthis
process in the chemical industry, which accounted for ten ofthe world's largest
hundred industrial firms in 1912 and for twenty in the 1995 top hundred. In
1912 the chemical giants ofBritain, Germany, and America were substantially
differentiated. The Germans, with excellent universities and moderately paid
scientists, were strongest in the research-intensive sector, where these cheap
human resources were a particular advantage, that is, in fine chemicals (then
mainly dyestuffs). The British, with plentiful and cheap supplies of capital,
excelled in the capital-intensive sector. The major technological innovation in
this sector, the Solvay process, had been licensed by its Belgian owners to
separate British, U.S., and German companies: ofthese, only the British firm,
Brunner Mond, was large enough to enter the top one hundred (the other li-
censees, Deutsche Solvay and the U.S.-based Solvay Process Company, though
operating in bigger national markets, were less profitable). The largest U.S.
chemical firm was Du Pont, an explosives specialist, with its national market
among mines and gun owners larger than European equivalents (the London-
based Nobel Dynamite Trust had a near monopoly in both the British and Ger-
man explosives markets, but was still just too small to qualify for entry to the
1912 list).
However, these superficially strong national differences among giant chemi-
cal corporations were short-lived. Du Pont had already in 1912 begun to focus
its R&D strategy, so that it was poised to become an engine of growth and
diversification for the company nach deutscher Art (Hounshell and Smith
1988). In the next quarter-century, the somewhat diverse chemical giants of
Britain, Germany, and America all became very much more like each other: as
research-intensive as the Germans, as capital-intensive as the British, and as
market-oriented as theAmericans. This occurredpartly by expropriation (nota-
bly by the British and Americans ofGerman patents and other assets) but also
by processes ofcompetition and emulation ofadvantages seen in domestic and
overseas competitors. Chemical engineering and o,financing techniques, re-
search laboratories, patent pools, and multinational investment all played their
part in the process. The competitive advantages that had once seemed nation-
ally distinctive rarely remained so. Indeed, with the widespread post-World
War II entry ofthe oil companies into downstream chemical operations, it be-
came obvious that not only rival chemical companies butalso vertically related273 Marshall's "Trees" and the Global "Forest"
Table 7.4 Adoption ofthe Multidivisional Structure (% ofthe top 100
corporations with M-form structure)
1913 1932 1950 1960 1970 1980-83 1993
U.S. 0 8 17 43 71 81
Japan 1 0 8 29 55 58
Germany 1 5 15 50 60 70
France 1 3 6 21 54 66 76
Italy 7 17 48
U.K. 0 5 13 30 72 89 88
Sources: See appendix B.
producers could copy and acquire the chemical companies' various research,
production, and marketing skills. The process was not all one-way, for there
were still some good reasons for pursuing distinctive strategies in a changing
and complex world,34 but, except in the pharmaceutical sector (where patent
protection is unusually effective), it was difficult for companies to entrench
any distinctiveness (and the supernormal profits that brought) for long.
The process of competitive emulation of distinctive advantages nationally
and internationally can be traced more precisely for what has been seen by
many business historians as the distinctive generic capability facilitating the
management of the giant diversified corporations that allegedly prospered in
the twentieth-century world. Chandler (1962) showed the postwar spread of
the multidivisional organization through U.S. industry, after its pioneering in
the 1920s by firms like General Motors.35 Table 7.4 shows that its postwar
spread throughout the five other major industrial countries was less rapid, but,
with only a slight lag, the M-form was widely adopted in Britain and, soon
after, in Germany, France, Japan, and even Italy, which was notorious for hav-
ing relatively few giant U.S.-style corporations.
Yet, in many respects, these countries' business cultures are undoubtedly
profoundly different; the spread ofthe M-form simply demonstrates that these
national differences are minimized by large-scale business institutions. Tech-
niques ofmanaging large corporations, ofharnessing central research labora-
tories to diversification, or ofadvertising national brands may easily be copied
by the large corporations of one nation from another, or a multinational may
34. A recent example is the rise of the British pharmaceutical industry in the last quarter of a
century. In 1970 the largest British pharmaceutical company rated only sixteenth in the world;
now Glaxo Wellcome is the largest in the world, and several others are ranked in the top twenty;
even a foreign company like the merger ofU.S. Upjohn with Swedish Pharmacia chose to base its
new headquarters in London. This change in the British position in research-based fine chemicals
is probably due to the advantages ofLondon as a commercial and financial centerand the availabil-
ity of cheaper scientists from good universities than the United States and Germany now offer
(Le., a similar advantage to pre-1914 Germany, though not one that any sensible country would
like to base its competitive advantage on for long, since it implies sustaining low living standards).
35. Though Hounshell (chap. 5 in this volume) suggests the problem ofapplying it to different
corporations, e.g., Ford.274 Leslie Hannah
enter the market to spread them. Competition and emulation thus do a great
deal to homogenize the giant-firm sector in reasonably competent advanced
industrial countries.36 In that sense, we should not be surprised at our earlier
conclusion that some popular characterizations ofnational differences in large
corporations appear to be baseless caricatures.
Where, then, is national differentiation in business cultures and business
institutions likely to reside, ifit is not in industrial giants? There are, I suggest,
two main locations. First, the culturally embedded characteristics ofbusiness
are often reinforced by local institutions underpinning small and medium-sized
businesses: such essentially localized businesses are inherently less subject to
(though, ofcourse, not entirely immune from) many ofthe pressures for inter-
national emulation and homogenization (Piore and Sabel 1984; Kogut 1993;
Knight 1995). Well-known examples in the literature are the German appren-
ticeship training system (which underpins the powerful world-market position
of German Mittelstand firms in the engineering industry) and Italian small-
firm networks (typified by Porter's well-known example [1990] of Sassuolo's
ceramic tiles). Firms may find it difficult to capture the resulting rents-so
they do not generally appear in lists oflarge firms like mine-butthe positive
impact on national living standards (and the sustainability of the differences
underpinning that) are likely to be considerable.
The second likely area of substantial and sustained national differentiation
is in the utilities and communications sectors. Public ownership or state regula-
tion of competitive processes dominate here and frequently prevent interna-
tional convergence ofinstitutions and standards. It seems quite likely, for ex-
ample, that the United States' ability to increase its lead over Britain in living
standards in the first half ofthe twentieth century was more due to its relative
performance in these services (in some of which Britain had an initial lead
which was reversed) than in manufacturing (in which the British productivity
gap remained remarkably stable) (Hannah 1995a; Field 1996; Broadberry
1996).
Research on contrasts in national economic performance and their relation-
ship to business institutions is difficult and not yet systematically developed.
There may be some mileage in further international comparisons ofgiant in-
dustrial corporations, but, ifmy findings are a pointer, business historians may
more productively focus their research on national institutional differences in
other directions. The prize of focusing our efforts accurately is an attractive
36. Even here, however, note that the adoption ofthe M-form stabilized in continental Europe
and Japan at lower levels than in the 'l\nglo-Saxon" countries:' One plausible explanation is con-
trasts in their capital markets: the monitoring processes ofM-form head offices may, for example,
be undertaken by universal banks or other agents in less fluid capital markets. Significantly, while
in the United States and United Kingdom a positive correlation is found between profitability and
M-form adoption (Armour and Teece 1978; Steer and Cable 1978), no such correlations appear in
Germany and Japan (Cable and Dirrheimer 1983; cf. Ingham 1992).275 Marshall's "Trees" and the Global "Forest"
one: the understanding of the microeconomic foundations of the macroeco-
nomic convergence processes that economists have identified in the modem
economic development of advanced industrial nations, and also of the limits
on such convergence processes.
Appendix A
The Worlds 100 Largest Capitalist Industrial
Enterprises of1912
All industrial enterprises37 with equity market capitalization of$26 million or
more in 1912 are listed in rank order within industry groups. For a fuller ac-
count of the construction of this population see Hannah (1998) and Schmitz
(1995). I am grateful to Alison Sharp for research assistance and to many na-
tional specialists for advice, which is more fully acknowledged in Hannah
(1998). For industry averages see table 7.3; for national averages see table 7.2;
for overall totals see table 7.1.
There are two major problems of the capability survival test for our 1912
giant firms: identifying the precise "heir" of-the 1912 firm, and dealing with
giant firms that were themselves taken over or otherwise "disappeared" be-
tween 1912 and 1995. Some arbitrary judgments are inevitable-the genetic
descent of corporations is less unambiguously defined by economic than by
human reproductive processes-but I have tried to apply standard rules to re-
solve difficult cases. Corporate descent is defined in organizational (rather than
legal or technological or marketing) terms. The successor firm ofAmerican
Tobacco isAmerican Brands, even though itno longer sells tobacco inAmerica
and recently disposed ofthe subsidiary bearing its original name in that busi-
ness.38 Considered strategic decisions to change business lines are accepted as
the corporate destiny: American Can is now Travelers Group (not part of the
Triangle Group that bought the can-making subsidiary), Singer is now Bicoas-
tal (not the Hong Kong-Bermudan sewing machine and computer company
that laboriously reassembled aworld-class sewing-machine business that Sing-
er's managers had believed had no future and had broken Up).39 Where mergers
have been reversed, the intervening life is ignored: Bayer is the successor of
37. Defined as all nongovernment enterprises with more than 50 percent of their activity in
mining and manufacturing.
38. Such decisions can notably affect the results: the American Tobacco subsidiary was sold
in 1994 for $1 billion, whereas at the 1995 benchmark the rest ofAmerican Brands was worth
$8 billion.
39. While in individual cases choosing these successor companies affects the calculated out-
come, overall the swings may well cancel out the roundabouts: the alternative option would show
American Can performing much worse and Singer performing rather better.276 Leslie Hannah
Elberfelder Farbenfabriken (the intervening IG Farben notwithstanding), Zen-
eca is the successor of Brunner Mond (the intervening ICI notwithstanding).
Where voluntary demergers have occurred, the larger core is taken as the con-
tinuing firm. However, when demerger derived from government action, large
resulting entities are credited as joint successors: Du Pont became Du Pont
plus Hercules and Atlas, Lothringer Hiittenverein became Knutange and
Klockner, Burmah is now Burmah Castrol plus BP, Western Electric is now
Lucent Technologies plus Northern Telecom.4o Firms may leave archeological
remains-as in the survival of the Ar~our and Swift brand names as a small
part of a subsidiary of Conagra-but both firms are (reasonably) judged no
longer to exist.
Yet some firms that have "disappeared" into a largerentity retain substantial,
separately identifiable capabilities in "quasifirms," clearly deriving from the
1912 entity. The National Biscuit Company is traceable in 1995, but had "dis-
appeared" into RJR Nabisco; similarly Imperial Tobacco is now a division of
Hanson Industries. In both cases the larger entity built on the surviving capa-
bility ofthe acquired company and sometimes recognized its independent via-
bility. Indeed, in these two special cases, both parents were discussing de-
merger oftheir subsidiary, so that it would again become an independent firm.
Clearly such cases on the verge ofcorporate "reincarnation" are different from
a 1912 firm that had truly "disappeared" in the sense ofbeing liquidated (e.g.,
Central Leather), sold at a price reflecting long-run decline (e.g., Pullman), or
acquired from bankruptcy protection by an optimistic corporation that proved
unable to tumitaround (e.g., AEG). Valuing surviving subsidiaries ordivisions
in 1995 as separate entities is problematic: AEG, for example, ifvalued on the
basis of capitalizing divisional profits, would actually have a negative value
(which would probably be too pessimistic an assessment ofits surviving capa-
bilities). I have therefore valued acquired firms at the estimated price paid for
acquiring their equity41 at the time oftheir substantive disappearance,42 con-
verting this to "1912 stock exchange prices" by the appropriate Standard and
Poor's 500 index point, as with 1995 survivors. Acquisition prices are usually
at a substantialpremiumto marketvalues, and as acquired firms were generally
declining,43 the earlier date of the acquisition imparts an upward bias, relative
40. However, most problems ofthis kind have been avoided by ourchoice ofdates: 1912 is after
the major 1911 divestitures imposed on Standard Oil and American Tobacco and before the major
German mergers (Vereinigte Stahlwerke and IG Farben) which were later reversed by allied anti-
trust action.
41. Where this was not published in the press at the time, I have estimated it from market price
data at the time ofthe merger. "
42. Some judgments verge on the arbitrary; e.g., where firms were temporarily absorbed into a
larger firm, then demerged, then later merged more completely, I have generally taken their later
disappearance, to preserve some symmetry with the treatment of surviving (but once merged)
firms.
43. As my data imply, see note 7.277 Marshall's "Trees" and the Global "Forest"
to surviving firms valued in 1995. This measure is, therefore, presented sepa-
rately in parentheses in table 7A.l. Recognizing its upward bias, it will be used
when a full sample ofoutcomes is required or where it is clear that it is biased
against the hypothesis being tested.
A final problem is nationalization. This was, for reasons not unconnected
with their size,44 a serious~·risk for the giant firms of 1912. All the Russian,
Mexican, and French firms in the 1912 list, many of the German ones, and
parts ofsome British ones45 were at some stage nationalized, and some remain
in state hands. Nationalized firms like BPand St. Gobain continued to be man-
aged like private firms and by 1995 were privatized, so can be treated in the
normal way. Giant Russian companies (of which there were three in 1912)
pose difficulties. Nobel Brothers (the only Asian firm in the 1912 list, with St.
Petersburg headquarters but mainly Azerbaijani operations) was expropriated
after the Russian Revolution; the company's rump ofWestem operations (e.g.,
in Poland) was worth little when finally liquidated in the 1950s. Two other
Russian firms in industries with no large quoted 1995 successors (one iron and
steel firm, the other in railroad engineering) are also pessimistically treated as
declining to zero value. However, where Western firms remain nationalized, I
have taken the 1995 balance-sheet assets less any traceable dedicated debts as
a proxy for market value.
Since this work was undertaken, one further omitted firm has been identi-
fied: Alpine-Montangesellschaft, an iron and steel firm with equity capital of
$72.4 million in 1912, based in the Hapsburg Empire (Austria). This firm be-
came majority-owned by Vereinigte Stahlwerke in 1926, then, after the An-
schluss, part of the Hermann Goring Werke, and was nationalized in postwar
Austria as Vost-Alpine. Its inclusion (ranked thirty-fourth in 1912) would dis-
place the Belgian-based Lothringer Htittenverein from the hundredth position,
but would not materially affect any ofthe major reported results.
44. On the Caligulan principle ("I wish the Roman people had but a single neck"), governments
were more likely to nationalize large firms than small.
45. BP was majority-owned by the state for most ofits twentieth-century existence, but not in
1912 or 1995; parts of several other 1912 companies were nationalized in Britain, but they were
left with a range ofcapabilities that have been considered the surviving firms. In some cases (e.g.,





Rank in Global Top stock market
100 in 1912 (and in prices)b
parentheses, 1995, Name ofCompany in 1912 (in
where still in top 1912 HQ parentheses, 1995 changed name 1912 1995
100) Location or alternative outcome)a Initial Multiple
c
Textiles and Leather
3 UK J&P Coats (Viyella acq. 1986) 287 (0.3)
68 US Central Leather (liquidated 1952) 40 (0)
69 US American Woolen (Textron acq. 1955) 40 (0.1)
82 UK Fine Cotton Spinners (Courtaulds acq. 34 (0.1)
1964)
Coal Mining
23 F Mines de Lens (Charbonnages de 94 0*
France)
28 F Mines de Bruay (nat. 1945) 87 (0)
29 G Gelsenkirchener (Ruhrkohle/RWE acq. 86 (0.2)
1968/69)
47 F Mines de Courrieres (nat. 1945) 55 (0)
61 F Mines d'Anzin (nat. 1945) 47 (0)
72 G Harpener Bergbau (VEW acq. 1992) 38 (0.1)
91 US Pittsburgh Coal (Continental acq. 1966) 31 (1.0)
Mechanical Engineering
4 US Pullman (Wheelabrator-Frye Acq. 200 (0.1)
1980)
8 US Singer (Bicoastal) 173 0*
10 US International Harvester (Navistar) 160 0.1
21 US Westinghouse Air Brake (American 102 (0.1)
Standard acq. 1968)
36 US John Deere 70* 0.9
50 US American Car and Foundry (Icahn acq. 52 (0.3)
1984)
64 R Briansk Rail and Engineering (nat. 45 (0)
1917)
79 US American Locomotive (Worthington 37 (0)
acq. 1964)
88 US Baldwin Locomotive (Armour acq. 32 (0.1)
1965)
95 UK Metropolitan Carriage (Vickers acq. 27 (1.9)
1919)
Nonferrous Metals and Other Mining
(including related refining andsmelting)
6 US Anaconda (ARCa acq. 1977) 178 (0.2)
12 SA De Beers 158 0.3





Rank in Global Top stock market
100 in 1912 (and in prices)b
parentheses, 1995, Name ofCompany in 1912 (in
where still in top 1912 HQ parentheses, 1995 changed name 1912 1995
100) Location or alternative outcome)a Initial Multiple
C
18 US Utah Copper and Nevada Consolidated 116 (1.1)
(Kennecott acq. 1923-33)
22 US Phelps Dodge 95 0.3
25 US American Smelting (ASARCO) 92 0.1
42 SA Rand Mines 65 0
43 SA Crown Mines (Rand Mines acq. 1968) 63 (0)
45 US International Nickel (lnco) 57 0.4
54 US Calumet & Hecla (Universal Oil acq. 51 (0.1)
1968)
60 UK Consolidated Goldfields (Hanson acq. 47 (1.6)
1989)
70 US National Lead (NL Industries) 39 0.2
83 US U.S. Smelting Refining & Mining 34 (0.2)
(Sharon acq. 1979)
86 SA E. Rand Proprietary 33 0
Iron, Steel, and Heavy Industrial
d
1 US U.S. Steel (USX Marathon) 741 0.1
14 G Krupp 130* 0.2
38 G Phoenix (Thyssen acq. 1963) 67 (0.1)
46 US American Can (Travelers Group) 57 1.9
48 G Deutsch-Luxemburg (Vereinigte 55 (0)
Stahlwerke acq. 1926)
49 G Gewerkschaft Deutscher Kaiser 54 0.9
(Thyssen)
51 UK Vickers 52 0.2
65 US Pennsylvania Steel (Bethlehem acq. 43* (0.5)
1916)
67 UK Armstrong, Whitworth (bankrupt 1926) 41 (0)
71 F Schneider 39 1.0
77 R Russo-BeIge (nat. 1917) 37 (0)
80 G Hohenlohe Iron & Steel (dismembered 36 (0)
and liquidated 1921-39)
81 Lux. ARBED 35 0.2
89 G Mannesmann 32 2.7
90 G Gutehoffnungshtitte (Maschinenfabrik 32* 1.0
Augsburg-Ntirnberg)
93 US Crucible Steel (Colt acq. 1968) 30 (0.3)
96 US Republic Iron & Steel (LTV acq. 1984) 27 (0.5)
100 Belg. Lothringer Htittenverein (Schneider et. 26 (0.6)







Rank in Global Top stock market
100 in 1912 (and in prices)b
parentheses, 1995, Name ofCompany in 1912 (in
where still in top 1912 HQ parentheses, 1995 changed name 1912 1995
100) Location or alternative outcome)a Initial Multiple
C
Branded Productse
9 US American Tobacco (American Brands) 169 0.4
11 (38) UK British-American Tobacco (BAT 159 1.3
Industries)
15 (44) US Eastman Kodak 128 1.3
16 US Armour (Greyhound acq. 1970) 126* (0.1)
17 UK Imperial Tobacco (Hanson acq. 1986) 120 (0.5)
19 US American Sugar (Tate & Lyle acq. 110 (0.1)
1988)
20 (75) UK Guinness 109 1.2
27 (19) UK Lever Brothers (Unilever) 87 3.4
30 US U.S. Rubber (Uniroyal) 80 0*
31 US B.F. Goodrich 75 0.2
32 US Swift (Beatrice acq. 1984) 75 (1.0)
34 US National Biscuit (RJR acq. 1985) 72 (1.8)
44 US Liggett & Myers (Grandmet acq. 1980) 58 (0.4)
52 (10) US Procter & Gamble 51 8.1
66 US P. Lorillard (Loews acq. 1968) 42 (0.7)
75 UK Reckitt & Sons (Reckitt & Colman) 38 1.0
87 US Com Products (CPC International) 33 2.3
97 US Cudahy Packing (General Host acq. 26* (0.1)
1968)
Chemicalf
37 (20) US Du Pont (+ Hercules + ICI acq. Atlas 69* 7.2
1971)
53 (94) G Farbwerke vormals Lucius & Bruning 51 2.0
(Hoechst)
57 (85) UK Brunner Mond (Zeneca) 49 2.4
62 (67) G Elberfelder Farbenfabriken (Bayer) 45 3.0
63 (95) G BASF 45 2.3
73 US American Agricultural Chemical 38 (0.2)
(Continental acq. 1963)
76 US Virginia-Carolina Chemical (Mobil acq. 38 (0.2)
1963)
84 F St. Gobain 33 2.5
85 Belg. Solvay 33* 1.1
92 US General Chemical (Allied-Signal) 30 3.1
Electrical Engineering
7 (2) US General Electric 174 4.7





Rank in Global Top stock market
100 in 1912 (and in prices)b
parentheses, 1995, Name ofCompany in 1912 (in
where still in top 1912 HQ parentheses, 1995 changed name 1912 1995
100) Location or alternative outcome)a Initial Multiplec
39 US Westinghouse Electric 67 0.7
41 (32) G Siemens 65 3.4
59 US Western Electric (Lucent Technologies 47* 4.7
+ Northern Telecom)
Petroleum
2 (3) US Jersey Standard (Exxon) 390 1.9
5 (1) N/ Royal Dutch Shell 187 4.8
UK
26 (22) US Indiana Standard (Amoco) 88 3.2
33 (14) US New York Standard (Mobil) 73 4.4
35 US California Standard (Chevron) 71 3.7
40 US Ohio Oil (U.S. Steel acq. 1982) 66* (3.5)
55 US Prairie Oil & Gas (Sinclair acq. 1932) 50 (0.3)
56 Mex. EI Aguila (Shell acq. 1919) 50 (2.4)
58 R Nobel Bros. (nat. 1917, rump dissolved 48 (0)
1959)
74 (16) UK Burmah Oil (Burmah Castrol + BP) 38 9.1
78 US Mexican Petroleum (PNP acq. 1919) 37 (2.3)
94 (58) US Texas Co. (Texaco) 29 5.2
98 (52) US Atlantic Refining (ARCO) 26 5.9
99 US Vacuum Oil (New York Standard acq. 26 (5.1)
1931)
aAcq. = acquired; nat. = nationalized.
bAn asterisk indicates that market valuation was not available. An approximation (usually based on bal-
ance-sheets assets net ofquoted debt) was used.
cLe., 31 May 1995 equity capitalization, revalued at 1912 stock exchange prices by the Standard and
Poor's industrial 500 index, divided by 1912 equity market value, that is, what in the text is described as
the "capability enhancement ratio."
dMany firms in this category included vertically integrated coal mines and shipbuilding yards in 1912.
eIn addition to the core food, drink, and tobacco industry, this category includes brandedhousehold chemi-
cals, rubber tires, and photographic goods.
fThis category includes St. Gobain, which in 1912 (as now) was mainly a glass producer, though in 1912




1913 inferred from Chandler (1962).
1932 from Chandler (1962) and based on fifty companies, butwith no multi-
divisionals in the next fifty assumed.
1950-80 percentages estimated from the chart in Kogut and Parkinson
(1993, 190), based on 150 firms-this may underestimate multidivisionals in
the top one hundred.
However, Rumelt (1974), basing his study on samples of 183-207 of the
top 500 firms, suggests figures of 20 percent for 1949, 50 percent for 1959,
and 77 percent for 1969, which rather surprisingly implies no greater propen-
sity to adopt multidivisional organization among very large than among more
moderate-sized corporations, at least after the war.
Japan
1913-32 inferred from Morikawa (1992, 113-14).
1950-80 from Suzuki (1991), based on 114 companies. He has a category
"mixedfunctional and divisional," halfofwhich I have allocated to the multidi-
visional category.
Kono (1980, 80) gives very similar results, though cf. Fruin (1992) for the
view that multidivisionals were not so common in Japan as these figures imply.
Germany
1913 "at least one," that is, Siemens, in Kocka (1978, 577).
1950-70 from Pooley-Dyas and Thanheiser (1976).
1983-93 from Whittington, Mayer, and Curto (forthcoming).
France
1912 from Levy-Leboyer (1980) (but cf. Daviet 1988).
1932 from Fridenson (1997).
1950-70 from Pooley-Dyas and Thanheiser (1976, 186-87).
1983-93 from Whittington, Mayer, and Curto (forthcoming).
Italy
1950-70 from Pavan (1970, 67), percentages based on 6/84 firms in 1950,
16/94 in 1960, and 48/100 in 1970.
United Kingdom
1913 inferred from Hannah (1976).
1932 from Hannah (1976), based on approximately fifty companies, with
the assumption that lower-ranked companies did not adopt the multidivisional
structure, as for the United States at that date.283 Marshall's "Trees" and the Global "Forest"
1950-70from Channon (1972, 67), percentages based on 12/92 in 1950, 29/
96 in 1960,72/100 in 1970.
1983-93 from Whittington, Mayer, and Curto (forthcoming).
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Comment Bruce Kogut
Leslie Hannah's paper is one of a few solitary gulls flying in the midst ofthe
storm of protest against the fascination of the large firm in business history
over the past few decades. Since a good deal ofthe storm is also no other than
Hannah, the paper provides an excellent venue to take a perspective of the
issues.
1The target ofthe attackis not simply the interpretation placedbyAlfred
Chandler on the British "fai~ure" due to personal capitalism, but the facile
reasoning by which careful academics and less than careful pliers ofthe trade
in the auctioning ofideas have come to associate size with success, a success
dressed up with the honey glaze of"organizational capabilities."
There is not madness in the idea that big means good. Countries such as the
United States, France, Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom are rich, and
they have what Prais has called "giant" enterprises. This generation of big
firms, moreover, has appeared to lead to ever larger shares of their national
economies. Table 7C.1 gives a summary of the data, and the data are simply
very impressive. Since these countries differ in their per capita incomes and
since these big firms play such a large role in their economies, it is entirely
reasonable to conclude that a good part ofthe explanation for country differ-
ences must lie in the capabilities oftheir large enterprises.
Hannah wants rightfully to rethink this conclusion. Business historians may
wince at the implications. For if governments would rather nationalize big
companies than many small ones, academics prefer to study them for the same
reason. "I wish the Roman people had but a single neck," Hannah writes, citing
Caligula. The population of small and medium-size business firms is large;
Marshall (1921) estimated the U.K. manufacturing population to be 45.8 per-
cent in 1901. We applaud the accomplishment, even if not to the satisfaction
ofall, ofChandler tracking the records of200 companies for each ofhis three
countries. Nevertheless, he left out hundreds of thousands of other firms, in-
cluding innovative small firms, breweries, and pubs. It is not surprising that
researchers have preferred the histories oflarge firms, but a principal message
ofHannah's story is that small and medium-size fihns are essential parts ofthe
comparison among countries. I return to this point below.
Bruce Kogut is the Felix Zandman Professor ofManagement and codirector ofthe Reginald H.
Jones Center at the Wharton School ofthe University ofPennsylvania.
1. See, for example, Hannah (1995).287 Marshall's "Trees" and the Global "Forest"























Sources: For France, Daviet (1988); for Germany and Japan, Suzuki (1991); for the United King-
dom and the United States, Prais (1976).
Let's put aside for now the implications and considerthe critical thesis. Han-
nah suggests that the virtuous association of size and capabilities should be
subjected to analysis. In this regard, he has hit upon a fundamental point of
confusion in the studies of large firms, namely, that the cross-section of the
largest firms tends to obscure a survivor bias. Take a cross-section at any point
of time and large firms are revealed. The important issue is why some large
firms grow and prosper and others dwindle and, sometimes, die.
To initiate this analysis, Hannah creates a list ofthe hundred largest firms in
several advanced industrialized countries for 1912, and then compares their
capitalization against survivors for 1995. In this exercise, he makes some as-
sumptions, such as the use of the U.S. Standard and Poor's deflator for all
countries, a crude pass that one suspects nevertheless goes a long way to make
the data for the years 1912 and 1995 comparable. The findings indicate the
following: (1) Only one-halfofthe large firms avoided merger, liquidation, or
nationalization.2 (2) Big firms in the United Kingdom survive more often than
those in the United States.
The first result casts doubt on the value offirst-mover advantages over a long
period oftime. Ofcourse, the period is eighty-three years. Wars have occurred,
boundaries have changed, and dividends have been paid. Still, it is fair to ask,
given the assumption that size matters, what is the story of survival and
growth? The answer is that 21 percent ofthe firms listed in 1912 were still in
the top hundred in 1995, and over half were still alive. Two-thirds ofthe large
firms failed to keep up with the movement in the overall market.
These conclusions are not unlike those of other studies on sustainable ad-
vantage. Pankaj Ghemawat (1991) took 692 businesses from the Profit Impact
ofMarket Share database, split into two samples for 1971 ROI. Sample 1 was
2. We can quibble over the significance ofignoring the distinction between debt and equity in
market capitalization and the difference in liquidation versus nationalization.288 Leslie Hannah
39 percent, sample 2 was 3 percent. In 1980, it was 21.5 percent and 18.0
percent. What is true at the business level applies also at the corporate level.
Not only are corporate effects on business profits hard to identify (Rumelt
1991), past innovative success is a poor predictor of future success (Mans-
field 1963).
Given these sorts ofbaselines, it is not surprising that there is considerable
reversion to the mean, ifnot outright reversal. Without information on the an-
nual average changes and their variance, it is hard to calculate the expected
distribution. Moreover, since there is considerable industry variation, one
would expect that firms in older industries would face less attractive growth
opportunities than those found in newer industries. In fact, Hannah finds evi-
dence for this. Yet Burmah Oil, Procter and Gamble, ARCO, and Du Pont
accounted for about a fourth of the total relative growth in the population.
These outliers might represent spontaneous drift, or superior "organizational
capabilities." The presence ofthree in the petroleum and petrochemical indus-
tries suggests also a simple market-opportunity story.
The second result, as listed above, argues against the statement that the
United Kingdom lost relative ground due to the failures inherent in personal
capitalism. Contrary to Hannah's finding that nationality is not a significant
variable in the performance of large corporations, his data show that U.K.
membership was a decidedly significant asset. Table 7.2 indicates that only 17
percent ofthe U.S. firms survived in the top one hundred of 1995; German and
British firms evinced survival rates of29 percent and 47 percent, respectively.
The rate of survival in any independent form, however, was more tightly
grouped, with British firms showing the best rate (60 percent), and the U.S.,
the worst (48 percent).
Hannah offers the speculation that British firms were hardened by a more
open economy in 1912, while German andAmerican firms were overprotected.
Of course, British productivity growth ranked behind its major competitors
prior to 1913 and was second to last from 1913 to 1929; Weimar Germany did
worse. From a position of25 percent ofworld trade in 1925, it fell to 12 per-
cent by 1929.
There is a more conventional complaint to be made against the use of size.
To what extent can we say that growth in size is an indication of success?
What happened to the Hannah (and Kay) of 1977 who, taking on the dragon
ofspontaneous drift (the argument that the tendency toward large-firm concen-
tration is an outcome of a random log-normal process), found that four-fifths
of the growth of British large business was due to mergers and acquisition?
Surely, Chandler's wild goose chase (one suspects he would have preferred
ducks as the hunting target) did not entail the rounding up of bulimic giants
who grew by their appetites rather than by their wits.
Size is interesting in a few ways directly, but it is mostly interesting as part
of a larger drama. There is little evidence that size is clearly associated with
scale economies. In the famous study by Rostas (1948) comparing U.S. and289 Marshall's "Trees" and the Global "Forest"
U.K. productivity, no evidence was found for scale economies leading to pro-
ductivity; even though the United States led absolutely in productivity for all
industries, the United Kingdom frequently had larger plants when measured
by unit output. Similarly, Prais (1976) found essentially no evidence for scale.
However, we do know that the industry distribution of firm sizes is corre-
lated among countries, as are concentration rates. I normalized the data taken
from Chandler's appendices, creating Z-scores for each firm in a given country
(Kogut 1992). Regressing these scores on industry dummies generated coeffi-
cients that indicate the effect ofmembership in a given industry on a member
firm's size. These industry coefficients are highly correlated across countries,
and their correlations increased over the three panels (approximately 1912,
1936, 1950). Extending this analysis to Japan and France generates similar
results. In short, Chandler's claim that variations in technical conditions lead
to large firms in some industries and not others is consistent with these results.
And it is not a terribly bad story, given its simplicity and the magnitude ofthe
problem, to claim that the United States and Germany often led the exploration
of these technical possibilities in the new industries of chemical, electrical
equipment, and transportation.
Itis a story, however, that is frequently puzzling. Forexample, contemporary
observers in Europe often claimed that their national markets did not support
the scale economies found in the United States, hence the causes oftheir weak-
ness. Yet American firms were increasingly important investors in Europe;
many of these firms were not large, and even when large, their plants were
often not unusually large (Kogut 1992). What American firms embodied was
a kind ofknowledge, call it national organizing principles, that had developed
steadily and cumulatively over the course of a century of experience (Houn-
shell 1984). To read the reports of the productivity missions from France and
England to the United States is a test ofwill to endure long accounts ofwhat
appears to be common sense; the pages are filled with minute description of
the routinization ofwork that was, strikingly, often absent in the European fac-
tories.
The ambiguity of size is, of course, that big size is as likely to be the out-
come offirms who know how to do it better as to represent a source ofadvan-
tage itself. Now, ifsize was the first-mover advantage, then Hannah should be
finding more powerful evidence for sustainable advantage. But if size is the
outcome of an unobserved advantage (be it organizational capabilities, pat-
ented technology, orgovernment contracts), then a firm's duration is contingent
on the evolution ofits broader competitive and institutional landscape.
This broader landscape consists offirms, workers (sometimes organized in
unions), governments, political interests, research centers, suppliers and buy-
ers, idea merchants, and, of course, mechanisms of financial intermediation
and corporate governance. To think ofbig firms as the engines ofgrowth is not
silly. The economic development ofKorea, Malaysia, India, Mexico, and many
other countries suggests thatbig firms are an integral partofthe process. Some,290 Leslie Hannah
such as Amsden and Hikino (1994), point to this recapitulation as evidence of
technical efficiency.
Large firms arise in industrializing markets because the diffusion of mana-
gerial knowledge is unevenly distributed across the space of firms, regions,
and nations. Smith was right, and Stiglerechoed this theme. The encapsulation
ofeconomic knowledge in the organizing principle ofthe division oflabor was
a source ofBritish industrial strength. Where it was absent in other countries,
it would have to be created. Stigler noted the same, adding that this division of
labor would be recreated through the greater vertical integration of firms in
countries where development was lagging.
In the 1800s, institutions of labor, finance, and suppliers were weak, as if
the industrial landscape was unpopulated. The explosion ofpowerful new tech-
nologies opened up these vistas for exploration. Large firms represented penin-
sulas ofcompetence jutting into the unorganized space ofeconomic relations
in rapid transition; they also represented powerful political counterweights to
governments, often intervening, often corrupt. This was the Cambrian explo-
sion in the exploration of organizational form in the absence of organizing
templates.
The boundaries ofnations, like the boundaries offirms, are meaningful. The
simple reason is that governments make laws and levy revenues. But nations
are also characterized by the systemic interdependence oflabor markets, man-
agerial hierarchies, governance and financial intermediation, and product mar-
ket competition. (See, for example, Soskice 1990.)
Consider, for example, France, for which Houssiaux (1957) has made an
especially exhaustive study ofthe emergence oflarge firms. He compiled a list
of the largest stock firms for 1912, based on their total assets. He followed
their evolution through successive panels conducted for 1936 and 1952.
There are a few minor, but still informative, points to observe. First, because
Houssiaux did notrestrict his attention to manufacturing firms, his list for 1912
shows a surprising dominance of mining firms (as notes Hannah in his list)
but also of maritime transportation companies, department stores (e.g., Prin-
temps), and water companies; to this day, the Compagnie Generale des Eaux
remains a remarkable company, large, multinational, and never nationalized.
Also, France, like the United Kingdom, was unusually strong in food and bev-
erage sectors, though its success in these areas is less provoking of bewil-
derment.
Second, the French firms evidenced a reasonably strong stability, despite a
very difficult period from 1929 to 1945. Table 7C.2 reproduces Houssiaux's
findings (1957, 295). Houssiaux concludes that "this rate ofmortality confirms
the hypothesis ofthe stability ofthe large enterprises."
The riposte is to concentrate on the list for 1952, for which it is noticed that
seventy-two firms are older than thirty years. (Houssiaux dates age from the
time of incorporation, which can underestimate age considerably, especially
for firms founded in the previous century.) Eight firms are dated to be less than291 Marshall's "Trees" and the Global "Forest"
















ten years old. But these, Houssiaux notes, were descendants or were founded
by the largest firms.
It is in this small observation ofthe entrepreneurial ties among the firms that
the contrast between focusing on firm size orfocusing on systemic relations is
clearly drawn. In 1952, Houssiaux (1957, 794) notes, the portfolio investments
(poste) ofthe hundred largest French companies rose to more than 200 billion
francs, while their gross assets had a value of 237 billion francs. These enter-
prises had 900 known financial ties, averaging 9 ties per firm. One hundred
twenty-seven of these ties tied these hundred to each other. Their administra-
tors, numbering 975, disposed of a total of 3,120 board seats. "In spite of a
production structure that was too little concentrated," concluded Houssiaux,
"the most essential businesses in France is under the control more or less di-
rectly by the largest companies." Nor has the importance of industrial groups
in France declined, as witnessed in the persistence ofcurrent studies.
The significance of understanding the firm in relation to its environment
does not only imply the importance ofinterfirm ties. One ofthe most troubling
periods in German economic history was the collapse of the traditional craft
institutions during the Weimar Republic. The inflation had led to a compres-
sion in wages, and the introduction of techniques of mass production threat-
ened to diminish the attractiveness ofattaining craft skills. The number ofap-
prentices fell compared to the prewar years, and the system was not repaired
until the 1930s. The impact of these strains is starkly evident in the data on
productivity, and is reflected in Hannah's observations on the low stability of
German enterprises during the interwarperiod (see his footnote 28). The weak-
ness ofGerman firms was partly the consequence ofthe breakdown ofWeimar
labor institutions. Large firms provided critical support to these institutions;
their hesitations, especially given the experiences of the revolutionary period
justafter World War I, were a major source for the breakdown in the education
and advancement ofskilled workers in the 1920s.
In other countries, the dominance oflarge firms hides a dynamic small-firm
sector. (See footnote 18 in Hannah's chapter.) To leave aside the familiar ex-
ample ofItaly, Sweden of the interwar period revealed an unusual dynamism
despite the depression. Dahmen (1950, 420) reports that between one-third and
one-halfofthe workers employed in 1939 belonged to firms started after 1918.
Behind the success ofa Volvo orAsea were the foundings ofmany small firms
that served as suppliers and sources offunding. Again, large firms rise to prom-
inence because oftheir instrumental role in national innovatory networks.292 Leslie Hannah
In all, the most important implication of Hannah's analysis, as he notes in
his conclusions, is that the comparison among countries must look at the entre-
preneurial conditions for the emergence ofnew firms. In this regard, the higher
mortality rate ofAmerican firms is an indication of a healthy entrepreneurial
climate. Should it be cause of celebration that almost half of British firms in
1912 still make the top one hundred list some eighty-three years later?3 Ifthere
is weakness in the British performance ofthis closing century, it is odd to fault
the large corporation for its survival rather than look for causes on the shop
floor, or at the small and medium-size portion ofthe distribution. No doubt the
appeal of Caligula's maxim for academic research explains the hesitation of
business and economic historians to take the plunge into a historical analysis
ofsmall-firm birth and growth.
IfHannah is right that Chandler rode off, like the uncle in Tristram Shandy,
on his hobbyhorse, only to have the horse return riderless, then attention paid
to the large firms in this paper has nevertheless paid handsome dividends. The
substance of Hannah's investigation into firm size fits a bit the irony Isaiah
Berlin noted about Marx, that the success ofhis ideas in the world offered his
own contradiction. The study ofbig firms remains a good horse to ride, even
ifthe interpretative landscape has radically changed.
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